Memory shapes time perception and intertemporal choices by Ortega, Pedro A. & Tishby, Naftali
Memory shapes time perception and
intertemporal choices
Pedro A. Ortega Naftali Tishby
University of Pennsylvania The Hebrew University in Jerusalem
ope@seas.upenn.edu tishby@cs.huji.ac.il
There is a consensus that human and non-human subjects experience
temporal distortions in many stages of their perceptual and decision-
making systems. Similarly, intertemporal choice research has shown
that decision-makers undervalue future outcomes relative to immedi-
ate ones. Here we combine techniques from information theory and
artificial intelligence to show how both temporal distortions and in-
tertemporal choice preferences can be explained as a consequence of
the coding efficiency of sensorimotor representation. In particular,
the model implies that interactions that constrain future behavior
are perceived as being both longer in duration and more valuable.
Furthermore, using simulations of artificial agents, we investigate
how memory constraints enforce a renormalization of the perceived
timescales. Our results show that qualitatively different discount
functions, such as exponential and hyperbolic discounting, arise as
a consequence of an agent’s probabilistic model of the world.
Keywords: Bayesian learning, time perception, intertemporal choice,
predictive information, free energy.
Significance Statement: We propose that perceived durations can
be quantified in terms of an agent’s memory changes due to the
encoding of past-future sensorimotor dependencies. Consistent with
findings in psychophysics, we show that events that are predicted to
be unlikely yet rewarding are perceived as being longer in duration.
Furthermore, through the simulation of artificial agents, we show
that the asymptotic behavior of intertemporal preferences can be
explained as a consequence of the model class employed by an agent
to predict its future.
1 Introduction
Our aim is to propose a model of subjective time based on information theory
and to investigate its implications relative to two phenomena:
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Time perception. Why does time appear to slow down when you visit a new
place, and speed up once you get familiar with it? Recent findings in psychology,
neuroscience, and ethology suggest that perceived duration does not coincide
with physical duration, but rather depend on the statistical properties of stimuli.
Experiments in psychophysics experiments have shown that, if presented with a
train of repeated stimuli at constant time intervals (e.g., a letter, word, object,
or face), subjects would perceive them as decreasing in duration [70, 44]. On the
other hand, the opposite effect is reported whenever the properties of a train of
stimuli are suddenly changed: brighter [10, 66], bigger [41, 73], dynamic [11, 31],
or more complex stimuli [54, 49] appear to last longer. Measurements of brain
activity have found that longer durations correlate with increased neuronal firing
rates, fMRI, or EEG signals [2, 20, 16, 35, 45, 40]. When combined with ideas
from information theory, these observations have led to the hypothesis that the
subjective duration of a stimulus is proportional to the amount of neural energy
required to represent said stimulus, and that this energy is a signature of the
coding efficiency [21].
Intertemporal choice. Why do $100 today feel more than $100 tomor-
row? Intertemporal choices lie at the heart of economic decision-making. The
economic literature has proposed early on [52] that rational decision-makers
prefer immediate rewards over similar rewards in the future because they dis-
count time—that is, future moments in time weight less in their assessment of
utility. Historically, the first and most commonly used mathematical model of
temporal discounting, namely exponential discounting1, proposes that decision-
makers discount future utilities using a single, constant discount rate which
compresses distinct psychological motives [52, 24]. The second most influential
type of model is hyperbolic discounting, which postulates that discount rates
decline over longer time horizons, i.e. future values decrease less rapidly than
exponential. Structurally, hyperbolic discounting does not possess many of the
elegant properties of exponential discounting (such as e.g. dynamical consis-
tency); however, it has significantly more empirical support [8, 34, 4, 59].
Temporal discounting was originally conceived as a property of the decision-
maker’s preferences (e.g. the utility function’s curvature). However, relatively
recent studies have investigated the role of subjective time as the underlying
cause of intertemporal preferences. For instance, prior work proposed that hy-
perbolic discounting arises due to a sub-additive perception of duration [46]; and
recent experimental findings [65, 74, 8] have suggested that intertemporal choice
patterns are well captured by treating time as a perceptual modality subject to
classical psychophysical laws (e.g. Weber-Fechner law).
Similar to prior proposals [60], the question we address here is: how does an
agent’s memory affect time perception and intertemporal preferences? Here we
propose a model of time perception in terms of an agent’s memory requirements
to encode (temporal) sensorimotor dependencies. This approach does not touch
1Also known as geometric discounting in the artificial intelligence literature.
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Figure 1: The interactions between an agent and its environment can be ana-
lyzed using information theory [1]. (b) If we discretize time and the continuum
of sensorimotor events, then the interactions can be thought of as a sequence
of symbols being written on a tape, generated by a stochastic process P . The
symbols at and ot are the action and the observation in turn t respectively, and
st is the corresponding memory state of the process. (c) As is typical in informa-
tion theory, we translate these symbols into binary codewords to emphasize the
complexity of generating them spontaneously using fair coin flips. Specifically, a
codeword of length l corresponds to a interaction occurring with probability 2−l
(panel c). The advantage of this view is that it enables a quantitative analysis
of the limitations on the process, such as the constraints on the dependencies
linking interactions at different points in time.
upon the cognitive processes that implement the sense of time (such as internal
clock and attentional counter models [27, 39, 17, 38]), nor does it attempt to
provide a phenomenological account [63, 72, 15, 18]. Instead, by restricting our
attention to the purely statistical properties of behavior, we obtain a model
of time perception that is agnostic to the implementation details and the sub-
strate. In this abstraction, a range of tools become available that enable the
quantitative investigation of representational limitations. Our main finding is
that a system’s memory simultaneously shapes its perception of time and its
intertemporal preferences, consistent with previous experimental findings.
2 Predictive Information and Free Energy
We consider adaptive agents that interact with an environment, e.g. a mouse
chasing food in a laboratory maze, a vacuum-cleaning robot, or a ribosomal
complex synthesizing proteins in the citoplasm (see Fig. 1). In artificial intelli-
gence, such agent-environment systems are often approximated using discrete-
time stochastic processes in which the agent and the environment take turns to
exchange actions and observations drawn from appropriately defined finite sets
A and O respectively [51]. In each time step, the agent acts following a policy
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P (a|s) which specifies the probability of generating the action a ∈ A when it
is in state s ∈ S. Similarly, the environment replies with an observation o ∈ O
following the stochastic dynamics P (o|s, a). The agent generates actions so as
to bring about its goals, such as optimizing a feedback signal or maintaining a
homeostatic equilibrium.
We center our analysis on the stochastic process describing the interaction
dynamics as seen from the perspective of the agent. An adaptive agent has to
simultaneously solve two learning tasks: predicting the environment and learn-
ing to act optimally. In Bayesian reinforcement learning [19], the standard
approach is to model this as an agent that uses past data to learn a parameter
θ ∈ Θ that encapsulates both the properties of the environment and its cor-
responding optimal policy. As the agent gains knowledge about θ, it improves
its predictions about the environment and simultaneously its ability to choose
better actions (see Section 3 for concrete examples). Accordingly, the stochas-
tic process P represents the agent’s beliefs about the interaction dynamics, and
the state s ∈ S is given by the agent’s information state or memory state2. We
will assume that the state s it is the minimal sufficient statistic, i.e. the min-
imal information shared between the past experience and the parameter θ, as
any redundant information contained in the past does not improve the agent’s
prediction abilities and thus can be discarded.
In order to establish a link between the agent’s memory state, reward func-
tion, and temporal perception properties, we first need to clarify what we mean
by memory and reward, and how to infer these from the stochastic process P .
2.1 Predictive Information
We first focus on the memory of the stochastic process. As is customary in in-
formation theory, the information content of a given finite sequence is assessed
in terms of its binary codeword length [14]. The binary length is a standardized
proxy for the complexity of a sequence, as it characterizes both the amount of
two-state storage units required for remembering it and the difficulty of gen-
erating it from fair coin flips [37] (Fig. 1b). Shannon proved that the optimal
expected codeword length is given by the entropy, implying that a minimal code-
word has length − log p, where p is the probability of the sequence [57]. Many
techniques exist to construct near-optimal lossless codewords for data streams;
a particularly elegant one is arithmetic coding [48, 61].
What is memory? Following Bialek et al. [6], imagine that we have measured
the first few interactions, and call this past xp. Given xp, we want to predict
a finite number of future interactions xf. Even before looking at the data,
we know that some futures are more likely than others, and this knowledge is
summarized by a prior distribution P (xf). If in addition we take into account the
2Notice that the agent’s memory is not localized within its body: rather, it is distributed
between the body and the surroundings. For instance, a vacuum-cleaning robot with a handful
internal states can use the objects in its environment as an external memory device—opening
the possibility to Turing-complete behavior. Hence, a comprehensive analysis of the agent’s
behavior must be based on the memory of the combined agent-environment system.
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information contained in the past, then we obtain a more tightly concentrated
posterior distribution over futures, P (xf|xp). The number of bits in the past
xp that are used to improve the prediction of a future xf is quantified as the
difference between the prior and posterior codeword lengths:
− logP (xf)−
(− logP (xf|xp)) = log P (xf|xp)
P (xf)
. (1)
1 measures the minimal memory that a system must possess to enable this
prediction3. If we average over all realizations, we obtain the mutual information
between the past and the future:
I(Xp;Xf) = EP
[
log
P (Xf|Xp)
P (Xp)
]
. (2)
In the literature, this quantity is known as the predictive information [5, 6].
Intuitively, the predictive information can be thought of as quantifying the
amount of memory that is preserved by the patterns, rules, or correlations
that relate the past with the future. An important property of the predictive
information is that it is subextensive if the stochastic process is stationary. In
other words, the predictive information has a sublinear asymptotic growth in the
length of a realization. This is in stark contrast to the entropy of the process,
which grows linearly with the length of a realization. Consequently, only a
vanishing fraction of the dynamics of the process is governed by patterns; most
of it is driven by pure noise.
2.2 Free Energy
Our second step is to establish a firm link between the statistics of stochastic
processes and their implicit rewards. The evolution of the stochastic process can
be analyzed using decision-theoretic tools by adopting a complementary view to
the previous one. In this interpretation, conditioning amounts to imposing con-
straints on an otherwise free evolution of the stochastic process. The assumption
is that, if uncontrolled, the future interactions xf would follow the stochastic
dynamics described by the prior distribution P (xf). However, when the agent
experiences the past interactions xp, it acquires knowledge that leads it to steer
the process into a more desired direction, resulting in the dynamics given by
the posterior distribution P (xf|xp) [69]. This transformation can be character-
ized as the result of maximizing expected rewards subject to constraints on the
memory capacity of the process [68, 42]. The associated objective function is
the free energy functional
3This difference can be negative. In this case, it can be interpreted as the amount of
information contained in the past xp that is inconsistent with the future xf.
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F (xp)[P˜ ] : =
∑
xf
P˜ (xf|xp)
[
R(xf|xp) + F (xp, xf)
]
(Expected Rewards)
− 1
β
∑
xf
P˜ (xf|xp) log P˜ (xf|xp)
P (xf)
(KL-Divergence) (3)
which is to be maximized w.r.t. to the distribution P˜ over futures xf conditioned
on the past xp. In the first expectation, R(xf|xp) is the real reward4 of the
future sequence xf conditioned on the past xp and F (xp, xf) is the terminal
reward of the sequence xpxf. The second term is a penalization that measures
the memory cost of changing the probability of xf. The parameter β > 0
is the inverse temperature, and it encapsulates the trade-off between rewards
and information costs: larger values correspond to cheaper memory costs and
therefore more control. The posterior distribution over the future is then defined
as the maximizer of (3) given by the Gibbs distribution
P (xf|xp) := 1
Z
P (xf) exp
{
β[R(xf|xp) + F (xp, xf)]
}
(4)
where Z is a normalizing constant.
Since (3) and (4) must hold for any past-future window, two consequences
follow. The first is that the free energy functional has a recursive structure given
by the equality between optimal free energies5 and terminal rewards:
F (xp) = max
P˜
F (xp)[P˜ ]. (5)
In particular, the terminal rewards F (xp, xf) that appear in equation (3) are
themselves the result of optimizing free energy functionals over the distant fu-
tures that occur after xpxf. If we average over the pasts, we get
E
[
F (Xp)
]
= E
[
R(Xf|Xp) + F (Xp, Xf)
]− 1
β
I(Xp;Xf), (6)
which reveals that the KL-penalization term is a constraint on the predictive
information, imposing a limit on the memory of the stochastic process during
the maximization of the expected rewards. The second consequence is that
rewards and log-likelihoods are related via an affine transformation
logP (xp|xf) = β
[
R(xf|xp) + F (xp, xf)
]
+ C, (7)
where C is a constant. Intuitively, this means that “the future xf has more
reward given the past xp” and “the future xf is more likely given the past xp”
4We assume that rewards are additive: R(v, w|u) = R(v|u) + R(w|u, v).
5From an economic point of view, the optimal free energy (5) turns out to be the certainty-
equivalent value of knowing xp; in other words, it is the net worth the agent attributes to the
future when it has experienced the past xp.
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are two equivalent statements6. In addition, (7) provides a simple formula for
estimating the rewards from the realizations of a given stochastic process.
3 Results
We have conducted simulations of agent-environment systems to achieve two
goals: first, to measure the agents’ subjective time frame (made precise later
in this section); and second, to calculate their implicit discount functions. The
simulation results (samples from the stochastic processes) provided us with the
necessary data to subsequently estimate (using the tools reviewed in the previous
section) the implicit memory constraints and rewards contained in the agent-
environment interactions.
For simplicity, our simulations are based on the standard framework of multi-
armed bandit problems [33]. In these problems, an agent gambles a slot-machine
with multiple arms. When played, an arm provides the agent with a Bernoulli-
distributed nominal reward, where the bias is initially unknown to the agent.
The objective of the game is to play a sequence of arms in order to maximize
the sum of rewards. Although simple, bandit problems pose many of the core
challenges of sequential decision-making. For instance, an agent has to balance
greedy choices versus choices intended to acquire new knowledge—a trade-off
known as the exploration-exploitation dilemma [64].
Throughout all our simulations we used two-armed bandits with arms la-
beled as “a” and “b” (Fig. 2e). To investigate how the learning ability impacts
time perception, we simulated agents with probabilistic models of increasing
complexity (Materials & Methods). To do so, we used four different types of
parameter spaces Θ: a singleton set Θ, representing an informed agent that
already knows the dynamics of the environment and the optimal policy; a finite
set Θ; a finite-dimensional parameter space Θ giving rise to a parametric prob-
abilistic model; and an infinite-dimensional parameter space Θ. We call these
agents informed, finite, parametric, and nonparametric [26] respectively. Note
that only the last three are adaptive. Furthermore, the agents use a probability
matching strategy known as Thompson sampling to pick their actions. Accord-
ingly, in each turn the agent samples one bias for each arm from the posterior
distribution over Θ and then plays the arm with the largest bias [67]. Fig. 2
compares the predictions made by the four probabilistic models.
The nominal rewards issued by the bandits should not be confused with
the real rewards defined in the previous section. Although nominal rewards
feature in the description of the problem setup of multi-armed bandits, finding a
policy that maximizes rewards is in general intractable. Therefore, the resulting
policies will not be optimal with respect to those nominal rewards. However,
6Similar points regarding the equivalence between rewards and likelihoods were made pre-
viously, see e.g. [25, 55]. It is also worth clarifying that we treat rewards as internal, subjective
quantities. This is consistent with expected utility theory [71, 53], but unlike the more re-
cent interpretation in reinforcement learning where rewards are treated as externally supplied,
objective quantities.
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Figure 2: Predicted futures for agents with increasing model complexity. Agents
play a two-armed bandit with Bernoulli-distributed rewards. (a–d) show their
predictions for the next three interactions after having experienced four initial
interactions xp = (a1,a0,b1,b1), i.e. where the agent switched to action “b” after
observing a loss in the second trial of arm “a”. The diagrams show the predicted
probability (cell width) of each path of interactions, and sidebars contain the
marginal probabilities. In spite of playing the same bandit depicted in (e), their
predictions vary due to their probabilistic models, ranging from an informed (a)
to a nonparametric model (d). The informed agent knows the Bernoulli biases
of each arm and therefore always makes perfect predictions and plays optimal
actions. The finite and parametric agents learn the transition probabilities of a
single two-armed bandit (e), whereas the nonparametric agent attempts to fit a
more complex model that is based on a sequence of bandits (f).
we can use the free energy functional to infer the real rewards optimized by the
stochastic process defined by the interactions between the constructed agents
and the bandits.
3.1 Present Scope and Perceived Durations
We measure the passage of time using clocks, e.g. hourglasses, wristwatches,
planetary movements and atomic clocks, all of which register changes in the
physical state of the world [47]. Analogously, an agent tracks the passage of
time through the changes in its memory state triggered by the interactions.
Maintaining a memory state induces temporal correlations between the past and
the future that are a signature of the underlying adaptive mechanisms [5, 56, 62].
Conversely, the lack of temporal correlations is indicative of the absence of
memory.
At any given point during the realization of the stochastic process, it is natu-
ral to define the “present” as the minimal information contained in the memory
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state that can be confirmed empirically, i.e. the minimal sufficient statistic of
the past (Fig. 3a,b). Imagine that the agent experiences the past xp and enters
state s. In this state, the amount of information the agent possesses about any
particular future xf is equal to
Present(xf) = log
P (xf|xp)
P (xf)
= log
P (xf|s)
P (xf)
(8)
bits. Similarly, only log
[
P (xp|s)/P (xp)
]
bits about the past are remembered.
Both of these quantities are upper bounded by − logP (xp), the total infor-
mation contained in the past. The scope of the agent’s present is the part
of the past/future that is remembered/predicted by the agent’s memory state
(Fig. 3d–f). In the special case of the informed agent, the present state has
zero span (Fig. 3d) because it does not need to maintain any memory in order
to behave optimally. In contrast, the parametric agent possesses an extensive
scope (Fig. 3e,f) that grows with more experience. In particular, the agent can
only remember its past up to a permutation of the interactions because the
distribution over observations is exchangeable. Furthermore, it predicts futures
that are consistent with the past experience; for instance, in the illustrated case
the agent’s most likely future repeatedly pulls arm “b” and observes “1” in ac-
cordance with the past xp = (a1,a0,b1,b1). Deviations from the past, such as
those caused by oddballs, contradict the memory state (i.e. they share a nega-
tive number of bits). Note that the possession of a present scope is a property
shared by all adaptive agents.
Given this definition of the present scope, we propose to model the passage of
time relative to the stochastic process as the number of bits in the memory that
change during the experience of an interaction (Fig. 3c). This definition rests
upon the assumption that the stochastic process is implemented on a compu-
tation model having fixed bandwidth per operation—such as a (probabilistic)
Turing machine, which can only modify a limited number of bits per cycle7
[58, 43]. We argue that this provides a more plausible time metric than the
time index or even the entropy of the stochastic process, for using the index
of the stochastic process would yield a non-homogeneous complexity per time
unit8. Formally, given a finite past xp and future xnxf, consider a transition
that increases the past from xp to xpxn and reduces the future from xnxf to
xf as depicted in Fig. 3c. The perceived duration of xn relative to this limited
window is equal to the difference
Duration(xn) = log
P (xf|xn, xp)
P (xf)
− log P (xf, xn|xp)
P (xf, xn)
= log
P (xn|xf)
P (xn|xp) . (9)
7In the case of a probabilistic Turing machine, the only bits that can change within a cycle
are those needed to represent the state of the Turing machine, the movement the header, and
the content the current cell in the tape.
8Since an individual interaction can be arbitrarily complex, forcing it to be computed in
one time unit would require a machine that can operate at an unbounded speed.
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Figure 3: (a,b) Comparison of the minimal sufficient statistic (i.e. the memory
state) of two probabilistic models. In the diagrams, the states are sequentially
numbered and color-coded to highlight repetitions. The probabilistic model of
the informed agent has only a single memory state, whereas the parametric
class possesses many. (c) The duration of a sequence of interactions is defined
by taking the difference in information between two different memory states.
The experience of new interactions causes the agent to acquire new predictive
information about the future while forgetting details about the past. (d–f) Illus-
tration of the agent’s present scope measured in terms of the information shared
between the memory state and the past/future paths. In (d) & (e), the cell color
encodes the cumulative information for the path starting from the past-future
divide and then leading up to the cell. Diagram (f) is obtained from (e) by
taking the difference between two consecutive paths. (g,h) Expected duration
of interaction paths. The cell color encodes the total duration of the path taken.
(i) Expected duration of individual interactions, obtained as the difference be-
tween the duration of two consecutive paths. In all diagrams, we conditioned
the models on the past xp = (a1,a0,b1,b1) as in Fig. 2.
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These durations are illustrated in Fig. 3g–i. The informed agent operates in the
equilibrium regime and thus does not experience time (Fig. 3g). In contrast,
the parametric agent perceives durations that vary with the current knowledge.
For instance, Fig. 3h–i show that predictable interactions decrease in duration
(e.g. “b1,b1,b1”), whereas a mistake (e.g. accidentally playing “a” instead of
“b”) and some of rewards result in longer durations. Oddballs, such as the
deviations from “b1,b1,b1”, do not necessarily entail longer durations.
3.2 Temporal Discounting
When an agent has a limited capacity to predict the future, it can only exploit
a fraction of the rewards that lie ahead. The precise amount can be inferred
by inspecting how much they affect the behavior of the stochastic process. If
the probability P (xf|xp) of choosing a future xf given a past xp is the result of
optimizing the free energy functional (3), then the change in log-probability can
be written as (Materials & Methods)
log
P (xf|xp)
P (xf)
= β
[
R(xf|xp) + F (xp, xf)− F (xp)
]
. (10)
Using (8), we identify the l.h.s. with the information about the future xf pre-
dicted by the present. The r.h.s. is proportional to the difference between two
terms: R(xf|xp) + F (xp, xf), the cumulative and terminal rewards of xf; and
F (xp), the certainty-equivalent value of all the potential futures. This result
states that the change of a choice’s probability depends exclusively on how
much it improves upon the summarized value of the choice set. In accordance
to decision theory, we refer to this excess as the rejoice (i.e. negative regret, see
Materials & Methods) [7]. The rejoice scales proportionally with the agent’s
memory and is therefore determined by the learning model.
In the economic literature, an agent that reacts only to a fraction of the
reward is explained through a discount function. Typically, a discount function
gives smaller weights to rewards that lie farther in the future [24]. Following the
same rationale, we next show how to derive discount functions that re-weight
the rewards in order to equate them with the rejoices.
We conducted Monte-Carlo simulations of the four agents to study the evo-
lution of their predictive performance (Materials & Methods). To isolate the
effects of the adaptive policy from the effects of learning the environment, we
also ran each agent a second time but using a (non-adaptive) uniform random
policy. All estimates were obtained from averaging simulated trajectories of
even length that were split in the middle to get a past xp and a future xf. The
results are shown in Fig. 4. The first panel (Fig. 4a) shows that the conditional
entropies of the past given the future H(Xp|Xf), which were obtained by av-
eraging over the negative log-likelihoods − logP (xp|xf), grow linearly with the
size of the window. As discussed in Sec. 2.2, log-likelihoods are affine transfor-
mations of the real rewards. In contrast, the mutual information between the
past and the future grows sublinearly, and the growth rate increases with model
11
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Figure 4: Monte-Carlo averages of agent-environment systems. The color-codes
are the same throughout the plots. Agents used either a random policy (solid
curves) or Thompson sampling (dashed curves). (a) Conditional entropy of
the past given the future H(Xp|Xf). This curve represents the average over
the negative, real rewards of equation (7). (b,c) Mutual information between
the past and future. The log-scale in (c) was chosen so as to emphasize the
logarithmic growth of the parametric case. (d) Expected nominal rewards of
the future as a function of the length of the past-future window. (e) Averaged
nominal rewards as a function of the mutual information, where the latter is
interpreted as a measure of perceived duration. The plot shows the empirical
data together with the fitted curves for agents using a uniformly random policy.
(f) Discount functions derived from the curves in (e). They provide lower bounds
for the discount functions used by the agents using an adaptive policy.
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Table 1: Least-Square Fits of PR and MI.
Model f(z) a b MSE
NR, Finite bz — 0.5013 0.3421
NR, Parametric bz — 0.5001 0.5309
NR, Nonparametric bz — 0.4721 0.0893
MI, Finite a(1− exp(−bz)) 2.0107 0.0567 0.0018
MI, Parametric a log(1 + bz) 1.5283 0.0884 0.0036
MI, Nonparametric azb 0.3291 0.6327 0.0779
complexity (Fig. 4b–c). The mutual information curves for non-adaptive poli-
cies provide a lower bound for their adaptive counterparts. However, adaptive
policies converge to the optimal policies in the limit, and so we expect their
mutual information curves to converge to the lower bound. The simulations
confirm this in the finite and parametric agents. Fig. 4c also shows that the
parametric model has a logarithmic growth in mutual information. In compar-
ison, the nonparametric model is seen to be super-logarithmic and the finite
model upper-bounded. Finally, we have also inspected the sum of the nominal
rewards contained in the futures. Fig. 4d shows that all the agents predict nomi-
nal rewards that grow proportionally with the length of the past-future window.
The slopes of these curves vary, and agents with adaptive policies predict better
rewards.
We computed linear fits of the nominal reward curves (NR) of Fig. 4d and
nonlinear fits for the mutual information (MI) curves of Fig. 4b for the agents
with uniform policies, which will serve as lower bounds for the ones based on
adaptive policies. Specifically, the nonlinear models have the following asymp-
totic behavior in the length z of the interval of past interactions: exponential
decayO(e−bz) for the finite agent; logarithmic growthO(log bz) for the paramet-
ric agent; and power-law growth O(zb), 0 < b < 1, for the nonparametric agent.
The last two have been justified analytically in previous work: Bialek et al.
[5] have shown that the predictive information of models based on finite- and
infinite-dimensional parameter vectors has logarithmic and power-law growth re-
spectively. Notice that since nominal and real rewards are both asymptotically
linear, choosing one or the other for our fits would lead to the same asymptotic
conclusions. The results of this fit are listed Table 1. Combining these fits,
we calculated the predicted rewards relative to the agent’s perceived duration
(Fig. 4e). The plots show that agents predict a superlinear growth relative to
their perceived duration. Given that the rejoice is proportional to the dura-
tion, agents must assign decaying weights to the predicted rewards, and these
weights are given by the discount functions listed in Table 2, shown in Fig. 4f
(Materials & Methods). The discount functions can be classified according to
their asymptotic decay, resulting in: infinite, linear, exponential, and hyper-
bolic discounting for the informed, finite, parametric, and nonparametric agent
respectively. These functions provide lower bounds for the discount functions
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Table 2: Discount Functions
δ(τ) Growth Type
Informed 0 0 Infinite
Finite max(0, 0.2274−0.1131τ) O(1) Linear
Parametric 0.2701e−0.6543τ O(e−cτ ) Exponential
Nonparametric 0.2314τ−0.5805 O(τ−c) Hyperbolic
of the agents using an adaptive policy.
4 Discussion
Our theoretical model relates the change of an agent’s memory state to the
perceived duration of interactions and to the rejoice. Concisely stated, this
relationship is given by
∆Memory = Duration = ∆Rejoice. (11)
Specifically, we have taken the memory to be synonymous with the minimal suf-
ficient statistics (i.e. encoding all past-future dependencies and only those) of
the agent’s probabilistic model. As suggested by the agent-environment setup,
we expect the memory substrate in animals to encompass every modulator of
behavior, ranging from the synaptic weights in the brain to the immediate sur-
roundings. Furthermore, an increase of the information-processing capacity per
interaction can be related to physiological factors such a decrease in body size or
an increase in metabolic rate [28]. Our agent-environment simulations illustrate
that while complex reactive behavior can emerge from limited to no memory
(as in the informed agent), adaptive behavior depends on the availability of
sufficient memory resources.
Consistent with previous findings in the field of time perception [21], the
model links the shortening durations of repeated stimuli to their increased pre-
dictability. More specifically however, it distinguishes between three cases. In-
teractions that are (a) well-predicted or (b) novel but irrelevant for future be-
havior imply fewer changes to the agent’s memory when experienced. Therefore,
their perceived duration is shorter. In contrast, (c) oddballs that are relevant
for future behavior (i.e. eliciting larger rejoice) induce adaptation and are thus
perceived as being longer in duration. This connection between the percep-
tion of time and rewards is supported by empirical findings in the literature
on attention [12]. For instance, in a recent study where participants performed
a prospective timing task, it was found that only oddballs signaling relatively
high reward compared to the standards were perceived to last longer, whereas
oddballs with no or little reward remained unaffected [22].
14
Within this context, it is instructive to examine two limit cases. Consider
an agent with a clock that ticks once per interaction. If the agent has little
to no memory (like the informed agent in our experiments), then the temporal
resolution vanishes and the clock spins infinitely fast from the agent’s point of
view. In contrast, if the agent possesses no capacity constraints, as is assumed
in the perfect rationality paradigm [50], then the clock slows down to a point
where it appears frozen. In this sense, memory capacity acts a form of temporal
inertia that quantifies the amount of information required to move the agent
one clock tick in time.
The memory constraints limit the agent’s ability to react to distant rewards,
giving rise to the phenomenon of temporal discounting. The simulation results
have shown how model complexity qualitatively affects the asymptotic behavior
of discount rates; in particular, exponential and hyperbolic discounting were
shown to arise from parametric and nonparametric model classes respectively.
Given that humans have been shown to display hyperbolic discounting [34],
our results suggest that human intertemporal value judgment may arise from a
memory formation rate comparable to that of nonparametric models.
The model of time perception can also account for some effects of general
memory manipulation. For instance, an increase of memory plasticity will cor-
relate positively with perceived durations. This phenomenon is consistent with
experimental findings, e.g. in which the administration of dopamine has led to
the overestimation of durations and the attenuation of impulsivity (steep dis-
counting) [32, 30].
Finally, is worth remarking that the relation between memory changes, du-
ration and rejoice that we have laid out here is not specific to said variables,
but rather a general property of quantities that are extensive/additive in the
interactions. In other words, the limitations imposed by the memory growth
rate appear to be a general property of perception. Verifying this property for
other perceptual modalities (other than time and reward) is a task to be further
explored in the future.
Materials and Methods
Multi-Armed Bandit Processes. We considered simple agents and envi-
ronments where the set of actions and observations were chosen as A = {a,b}
and O = {0, 1} respectively. For the actions, the symbols “a” and “b” encode
the left and the right arm respectively; for the observations, 0 and 1 correspond
to a nominal loss and reward responses. The environment is a two-armed bandit
characterized by a bias vector θ = [θa, θb]
T , where θa ∈ [0, 1] for a ∈ {a, b}.
When the agent pulls arm a, the bandit replies with a reward drawn from a
Bernoulli distribution with bias θa. When the biases are known, as is the case
in the informed agent, then the optimal strategy consists in always playing the
arm with the highest bias, a∗ = arg maxa{θa}. In our simulations of the in-
formed agent, we chose a bias vector equal to θ = [ 14 ,
3
4 ]. Hence, the optimal
strategy was to pick a = b in every turn.
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When the biases are unknown, the agent’s uncertainty is modeled by placing
a prior distribution over the bias vector [19, 29]. In the case of the finite agent,
the hypothesis class is given by the set of four bias vectors Θ = { 14 , 34}×{ 14 , 34},
and it places the prior pmf
f(z;α, β) :=
zα−1(1− z)β−1∑
ξ= 14 ,
3
4
ξα−1(1− ξ)β−1
over each arm’s bias. The terms α > 0 and β > 0 are hyperparameters that keep
track of the total number of times that the bandit responded with rewards and
a losses respectively [9, 13]. The resulting prior pmf is a product distribution
P (θ) = f(θa;αa, βa) f(θb;αb, βb).
The parametric agent enriches the finite case by extending the hypothesis class
to all the bias vectors in the unit square Θ = [0, 1]×[0, 1], placing an independent
Beta pdf
B(z;α, β) := z
α−1(1− z)β−1´ 1
0
ξα−1(1− ξ)β−1 dξ
over each vector component. Because both agents have priors that are conjugate
to the Bernoulli distribution, their posteriors are obtained by just updating the
four hyperparameters αa, βa, αa, and βb. For example, if the agent plays arm
“a” and the environment replies with a reward, then the hyperparameter αa is
incremented in one count and the others are kept equal.
The nonparametric agent is based on a more flexible model. Rather than as-
suming a single bandit, the model considers a sequence of two-armed bandits la-
beled as N = 1, 2, 3, . . ., each one having its own vector of biases [θa(N), θb(N)].
Starting at bandit N = 1, the agent moves to the next bandit N → N + 1
whenever it receives a reward, and returns to the first bandit (N = 1) when
it receives a loss. In each interaction, only the hyperparameters of the current
bandit are updated. The resulting hypothesis class is given by the set Θ of all
maps θ : N→ [0, 1]× [0, 1].
To generate actions, all the agents employ either a uniform strategy or
Thompson sampling [67]. In the latter case, an agent generates Monte-Carlo
samples of the biases of the current bandit from its posterior distribution. Sub-
sequently, it plays the arm associated to the largest bias.
At the beginning of each simulation, all the hyperparameters of an agent’s
probabilistic model where initialized to one, i.e. α = 1, β = 1 for the finite
and parametric agents, and α(N) = 1, β(N) = 1 for all N ∈ N in the case
of the nonparametric agent. This corresponds to a uniform distribution over
every bias. Furthermore, the true (unknown) biases were sampled uniformly in
accordance to the agents’ priors.
Sufficient Statistics. The sufficient statistics for the four agents follow di-
rectly from their probabilistic models. The informed agent’s stochastic process
is memoryless; therefore, its sufficient statistic can be modeled as a constant
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function of the past. The predictions made by the finite, parametric, and non-
parametric agents depend upon the total counts of rewards and losses (i.e. the
hyperparameters) observed so far, the number N of the bandit, and the action
issued during the current interaction if available.
Rejoice. The main difference between expected utility theory [71, 53] and
regret theory [23, 3, 36] is that in the former decision-makers maximize the
expected utility, whereas in the latter decision-makers minimize regret, i.e. they
choose an action a that minimizes a function Q{U(a), U(aref)}, where aref is a
reference action and U is a utility function. The regret function quantifies how
much the utility U(a) of a is affected by what would have happened had aref
been chosen instead of a [7]. Arguably, the simplest regret function is given by
the difference Q{U(a), U(aref)} = U(aref)− U(a).
Decision-making based on the free energy functional can be related to regret
theory. The solution to the average free energy functional is given by Gibbs
distribution
P (xf|xp) = 1
Z
P (xf) exp
{
β
[
R(xf|xp) + F (xp, xf)
]}
, (12)
where the normalizing constant Z is the partition function. It is well-known
that the optimal free energy is equal to
F (xp) := max
P˜
F (xp)[P˜ ] =
1
β
logZ.
In the economic literature, this quantity is known as the certainty-equivalent,
and it is a function of the set of future rewards {R(yf|xp) + F (xp, yf)}yf that
measures the agent’s subjective worth of the cumulative rewards that lie in the
future. The value is bounded as
E
[
R(Xf|Xp) + F (Xp, Xf)
∣∣∣∣xp] ≤ F (xp) ≤ maxxf
{
R(xf|xp) + F (xp, xf)
}
,
where the lower and upper bounds are attained when β → 0 and β → ∞
respectively. Rearranging (12) as
log
P (xf|xp)
P (xf)
= β
[
R(xf|xp) + F (xp, xf)− F (xf)
]
,
reveals that the changes in choice probabilities are governed by a rejoice (neg-
ative regret) function that contrasts the rewards of future realizations against
the certainty-equivalent:
log
P (xf|xp)
P (xf)
= −βQ
{
R(xf|xp) + F (xp, xf), F (xf)
}
.
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Monte-Carlo Simulations. The curves for the conditional entropy (Fig. 4a),
the mutual information (Fig. 4b & c), and the predicted rewards (Fig. 4d)
were obtained from Monte-Carlo averages made at equally spaced locations
(t = 1, 11, 21, . . . , 201). To calculate an estimate at location t, we averaged
the log-probabilities and rewards of interaction sequences of length 2t generated
from the agent’s stochastic process described in the previous section. Given the
n-th simulated interaction sequence, let x
(n)
p and x
(n)
f be its first and second
half respectively. Furthermore, let Rnom(x
(n)
f |x(n)p ) denote the nominal rewards
over the second half, calculated as the sum of the observations in x
(n)
f . The
entropies H(Xp, Xp), H(Xf|Xp), H(Xf), and the expected nominal rewards
E
[
Rnom(Xf|Xp)
]
were estimated as
H(Xp, Xf) ≈ − 1
N
N∑
n=1
logP (x(n)p , x
(n)
f ), (13)
H(Xf|Xp) ≈ − 1
N
N∑
n=1
log
P (x
(n)
p , x
(n)
f )
P (x
(n)
p )
, (14)
H(Xf) ≈ − 1
N
N∑
n=1
log
{
1
M
M∑
m=1
P (x
(m)
p , x
(n)
f )
P (x
(m)
p )
}
, (15)
E
[
Rnom(Xf|Xp)
] ≈ 1
N
N∑
n=1
Rnom(xf|xp)(n). (16)
We used the difference between (15) and (13) as an estimate for the mutual
information I(Xp;Xf) = H(Xf) − H(Xf|Xp). In particular, note that the es-
timate of the marginal entropy H(Xf) was obtained using a doubly-stochastic
Monte-Carlo average over NM samples in which the second half was kept fixed
during blocks of size M . The conditional entropy of the past given the fu-
ture, which stands for a proxy of the real rewards, was estimated using the
formula H(Xp|Xf) = H(Xp, Xf)−H(Xf). The number of samples were chosen
as N = 1000 and M = 3000.
In the cases of the parametric and nonparametric agents, we made additional
approximations to the Thompson sampling strategy. Specifically, we used the
normal approximation to the Beta distribution:
B(z;α, β) ≈ N
(
z;µ =
α
α+ β
, σ2 =
αβ
(α+ β)2(1 + α+ β)
)
.
The approximation holds well for large values of α and β, and it has the advan-
tage of keeping both the generation and evaluation of action samples computa-
tionally tractable. The probability of choosing arm “a” then becomes equal to
1 − F (c) , where F is the cdf of the normal distribution with zero mean and
unit variance, and c = 12 (µa − µb)
√
σ−2a + σ−2b .
18
Temporal discounting. The discount functions were derived using the fol-
lowing procedure. The choice of the functional forms of the model classes listed
in Table 1 were motivated by prior studies of the long-term behavior of the en-
tropy and the predictive information [5]. The exception is the functional form of
the finite model’s mutual information, which was chosen through inspection of
the curve. The parameters were fit (least-square regression) to the data obtained
in the Monte-Carlo simulations. This yielded two functions per agent: the ex-
pected nominal reward function R(z) and the mutual information I(z), both as
a function of the number of interactions z ∈ (0,∞) of the past and the future
window. For analytical convenience, we extended the number of interactions
form the discrete to the continuous domain. The two functions R(z) and I(z)
were then connected via z. Fig. 4e is obtained by plotting R(τ) := R(I−1(τ)),
where the inverse I−1(τ) is the number of interactions as a function of the mu-
tual information τ ∈ (0,∞), now interpreted as a temporal coordinate. These
inverses were equal to: z = 1b log(
a
a−τ ) for the finite model; z =
1
b (e
τ/a − 1)
for the parametric model; and z = ( τa )
1/b for the nonparametric model. The
respective nominal reward functions R(τ) are just rescaled versions of I−1(τ).
To obtain the discount functions, we must make sure that the discounted future
grows proportionally in τ , that is
ˆ t=τ
t=0
δ(t)
∂R
∂t
(t) dt = ατ,
because the rejoice ατ is proportional to the mutual information. Assuming
w.l.g. that α = 1, this is achieved when
δ(t) =
(∂R
∂t
)−1
(t).
Thus, the resulting discount functions have the shapes: δ(τ) = d − cτ for the
finite case; δ(τ) = de−cτ , for the parametric case; and δ(τ) = dτ−c for the
nonparametric case. Note that the constants c and d are positive in each case.
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